UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-24-2020

State v. Kropp Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 47713

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"State v. Kropp Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 47713" (2020). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All.
8167.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/8167

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
11/24/2020 12:29 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plain tiff-Respondent.
vs.
DAVID ALEXANDER KROPP,
Defendant-Appellant,

__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

S.Ct. No. 47713
Kootenai CR-2017-13500

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho
In and For the County of Kootenai

HONORABLE SCOTT WAYMAN
Presiding Judge

Dennis Benjamin, ISB No. 4199
Lawrence Wasden
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP ATTORNEY GENERAL
303 West Bannock
Andrew Wake, Deputy
P.O. Box 2772
Criminal Law Division
Boise, ID 83701
P.O. Box 83720
(208) 343-1000
Boise, ID 83720-0010
db@nbmlaw.com
(208) 334-2400
Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Table of Authorities ........................................................................................... 11

II.

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1

III.

Argument in Reply .............................................................................................. 1

IV.

A.

The Trial Court Erred by Proceeding with the Trial in Mr. Kropp's
Absence ..................................................................................................... 1

B.

Even if Mr. Kropp's Afternoon Absence was Voluntary, the Court had
Already Committed Structural Error ...................................................... 5
1.

The error was structural ............................................................... 5

2.

Alternatively, the state has not shown the error was harmless .. 7

Conclusion

........................................................................................................ 8

1

I.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) ......................................................................... 2
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) ................................................................. 5
United States v. Schor, 418 U.S. 26 (2 nd Cir. 1969) .................................................... 6
STATE CASES

State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho (Ct. App. 1994) ................................................................ 4, 5
State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349 (Ct. App. 2007) ............................................................. 5
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) ............................................................................ 7
State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d 1097 (Wash. 1994) ........................................................... 5

11

IL

INTRODUCTION

The state attempts to justify the court's ruling by referring to actions taken
by Mr. Kropp after that ruling was made. There are several logical problems with
this line of argument, and it should be rejected by this Court. First, the district
court's initial finding that Mr. Kropp was voluntarily absent is reviewed based upon
the record as it existed at the time of the ruling. Later events are irrelevant to the
correctness of that decision. Moreover, events at trial are often influenced by earlier
court rulings. Mr. Kropp might have decided to not appear for the afternoon session
of court because he was convinced that the court had already made it impossible for
him to receive a fair trial. Finally, even if Mr. Kropp's absence in the afternoon of
the trial was voluntary, the court had already committed structural error by
continuing the morning session in his involuntary absence.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The Trial Court Erred by Proceeding with the Trial in Mr. Kropps Absence.
The state perplexingly argues that the question of whether Mr. Kropp was

voluntarily absent at the time the court denied the motion to continue and
proceeded with the trial "has little to do with whether Kropp was voluntarily absent
- even assuming, arguendo, that the district court was not initially justified in
concluding that [Mr.] Kropp was voluntarily absent[.]" State's Brief, p. 12. The state
reasons that Mr. Kropp must have been voluntarily absent when the court denied
his first motion to continue because Mr. Kropp never appeared for the trial. That is
incorrect because Mr. Kropp could have been - as the evidence shows -
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involuntarily absent in the morning, but then decided to not appear for the
remainder of the trial because his right to be present had already been violated. He
may have concluded that the court was not treating him fairly and that he could not
get a fair trial given the court's rash decision to proceed in his absence and that
conclusion was why he was absent in the afternoon. It would be unjust to absolve
the court of its error when it was the cause of Mr. Kropp's later absence. See

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011) (Fourth Amendment violated when the
police unreasonably manufacture or create the exigent circumstances which later
purports to justify a warrantless search).
Here, the record shows that defense counsel told the court at 1:17 p.m., that
he had received a text message, "Almost there," 1 two minutes prior and a message,
"Eight miles from Coeur d'Alene," ten minutes prior. R 166; T p. 366, In. 4-9. What
the record does not show is what his counsel communicated back to him. It is
possible and even probable that counsel informed Mr. Kropp that the trial had not
been delayed. In fact, the state asserted that trial counsel had communications with
Mr. Kropp in addition to the two text messages. T p. 367, 1. 24- p. 368, 8. Defense
counsel did not respond to the state's accusation that he communicated with Mr.
Kropp.
That conversation, if it took place, explains why Mr. Kropp would have
bothered to continue his drive toward Coeur d'Alene after being towed out of the
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There is no evidence that this was a "false claim" as the state asserts. State's
Brief, p. 1 7.
2

snowbank only to change his destination when he was "almost there." T p. 366, 1. 45. The fact that he was almost to the courthouse by 1:00 p.m. is evidence that he
intended to appear at trial that morning and only changed his mind just before
arriving, possibly because he was told that the continuance had been denied and his
constitutional right to be present violated.

It is no surprise that events at trial are often influenced by earlier court
rulings or additional information gained during the trial day. Mr. Kropp might have
decided to not appear for the afternoon session of court because he concluded that
the court had already made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial. In that case,
Mr. Kropp's later absence from trial would have been the result of the trial court's
violation of his right to be present, not evidence of an earlier intent to absent
himself from the trial. But even if Mr. Kropp was incorrect about the fairness of the
trial, a 1:00 p.m. decision to absent himself does not even suggest that he was
voluntarily absent at 9:00 a.m., given the intervening court ruling. Thus, his
afternoon absence does not tend to support the trial court's earlier finding of
voluntary morning absence.
Defense counsel's statement that Mr. Kropp left in the middle of the trial (T
p. 459, 1. 12-15), also does not suggest Mr. Kropp was voluntarily absent that
morning. To the contrary, it implies Mr. Kropp's morning absence was involuntary.
And, Mr. Kropp's statement at sentencing that it was wrong of him to not appear
during trial (T p. 492, 1. 14) does not show he did not intend to appear that
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morning. 2 It is only an acknowledgment that he should have appeared at court as
soon as he was able even though the court had violated his constitutional right to be
present. But the lack of legal excuse for his afternoon absence does not prove his
morning absence was voluntary nor does it excuse the court's earlier error.
The above is why the court's ruling is reviewed based upon the record as it
existed at the time of the ruling. Later events are irrelevant to the correctness of
that decision. State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 328 (Ct. App. 1994), requires the
district court to make sufficient inquiry into the circumstances of a defendant's
disappearance to justify a finding whether the absence was voluntary and to make a
preliminary finding of voluntariness at the time of the absence when justified. Id
Here there was not sufficient evidence to justify a preliminary finding of
voluntary absence. See Opening Brief, p. 10-11. The fact that Mr. Kropp did not
contact his attorney until 8:52 a.m., only shows that he was running late to court, a
common occurrence as every trial court knows. (If he had intended to not show up,
there would be no reason for him start toward the court that morning or to contact
counsel either at 8:52 a.m. or 1:07 p.m.) Further, the court based its finding of
voluntariness based upon irrelevant considerations such as the fact there is bus
service in Plummer and that Mr. Kropp "voluntarily" chose to stay in St. Maries. T
p. 288, 1. 1-5. Finally, the court did not apply the presumption against finding a

Mr. Kropp's apologetic tone is understandable. It would not have been prudent for
him to complain to the court at sentencing that it had erred in denying the motion
to continue and had violated his constitutional rights. Likewise, trial counsel would
not have taken the court to task for its trial error when he was asking the court to
quash the arrest warrant.
2
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waiver required by Elliott, 126 Idaho at 328, adopting State v. Thomson, 872 P.2d
1097, 1100 (Wash. 1994). See also State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352 (Ct. App.
2007) ("courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver."). (Mr.
Kropp notes that the state never argues that the court applied the legal
presumption in its decision-making.)
An independent review of the record shows the court should have granted the
motion to continue. Whether Mr. Kropp would have made the same decisions if a
continuance had been granted cannot be determined and is not relevant to the
correctness of the court's ruling. Just as the discovery of contraband cannot serve as
a post-hoc justification for an illegal search, Mr. Kropp's actions after the trial court
had already violated his right to be present during trial cannot excuse the court's
initial constitutional violation.

B.

Even ifMr. Kropp's Afternoon Absence was Voluntary, the Court had
Already Committed Structural Error.
Even if Mr. Kropp's absence in the afternoon of the trial was voluntary, the

court had already committed structural error by continuing the morning session in
his involuntary absence.
1.

The error was structural.

The state argues that an erroneous trial in absentia is not structural error
noting that the United States Supreme Court has concluded that a violation of
F.R.Cr.P. 43 "may in some circumstances be harmless error," State's Brief, p. 15,
citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975). But a technical violation of
Rule 43 is not equivalent to the taking of state's evidence during the involuntary
5

absence of the defendant. In fact, Rogers did not involve a trial in absentia. There,
the judge answered a jury inquiry without bringing the jury into open court and
allowing the defendant to be present while the inquiry was answered. The Supreme
Court found that "the nature of the information conveyed to the jury, in addition to
the manner in which it was conveyed" was reversible error. 422 U.S. at 39-40. The
sole case cited by the Rogers Court also involved a district court answering a jury
question outside of the defendant's presence. Id. citing United States v. Schor, 418
U.S. 26, 29-30 (2 nd Cir. 1969). The Schor Court noted that there was a "presumption
of prejudice" when the trial court

communicated with the jury in the absence of

defendant and found reversible error in that case. 418 F.2d at 31.
In the absence of controlling authority, Mr. Kropp asked this Court to find
that an erroneous trial in absentia is structural error. Opening Brief, p. 14-15.
Notwithstanding the state's assertion otherwise (State's Brief, p. 19), Mr. Kropp
does argue that his right to be present at trial was violated. Opening Brief, p. 7-11.
The violation here is much more serious than the trial errors in handling jury
inquiries found to be reversible in Rogers and Schor. Here, the state presented the
testimony of six witnesses: Michelle Dickerson, Larry Bowman, Detective Jeff
Thurman, Officer Patrick Finan, and Deputy Kyle Hutchison outside of Mr. Kropp's
presence. R 163-167. As previously noted, the right to be present at one's own
criminal trial is of undeniable value but the effect of the deprivation of that right
defies analysis by harmless-error standards because it affects "the framework
within which the trial proceeds, and are not simply an error in the trial process
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itself." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10.
Thus, the Court should find such error to be structural, vacate the
convictions, and remand for a new trial.
2. Alternatively, the state has not shown the error was harmless.
The state has failed to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt as required by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). The entirety of its
harmless error argument follows:
Had the district court delayed the beginning of the second day of trial until
that afternoon or even the next day, when it was perfectly clear that Kropp
was not going to show and was not stuck in a ditch, trial would have
continued in his absence and he would be in exactly the position that he is in
now.
State's Brief, p. 15-16. But this contention is entirely based upon the unwarranted
assumption that Mr. Kropp would not have attended the afternoon session had the
court granted the motion to continue. To the contrary, the fact that he did not
attend after telling his lawyer that he was only "Eight miles from Coeur d'Alene"
and that he was "Almost there" admits of the possibility that trial counsel informed
him that the trial had not been delayed and Mr. Kropp decided to not attend the
afternoon session because of the trial court's error. Thus, the fact that Mr. Kropp
did not appear in the afternoon does not render the court's error harmless because it
was the error which was the cause of his afternoon absence. If so, it was doubly
prejudicial, not harmless.
Even if the error is not deemed to be structural, the state has not met its
burden under Perry to prove it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Kropp asks the Court to vacate the judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 24 th day of November 2020.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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